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SINCE the beginning of our national history the Constitution, which is essentially the source of the law rather than its frame-
work, has with more or less promptitude fulfilled the function 
of sanctioning new rules of action which will permit a fairly sym-
~etrical institutional development in the face of the changing con-
ditions of the environment in which the people live and think and 
act. Always the habits of the people are changing, always the sit-
uation facts are being modified, and the Constitution in its widest 
and truest meaning but provides the means whereby thru this flux 
the body of the people may crystallize its thought and usage into 
the forms of sanctioned law. It is only by such continual adapta-
tion that the growth of a people becomes not abortive but whole-
some and the interrelationship of its parts is kept from perversion. 
It is because business has risen to a national scale and geograph-
ical markets have come to include several states in most industries 
and all states in many industries that there has come a demand for 
more direct national regulation1 of those who engage in business on 
this scale. It is asserted that uniform rules of organization and 
conduct should obtain2 for those dealing in a single market. It is 
declared that when one jurisdiction,-a state--creates and lays 
down rules of action for a corporation which may never maintain 
plant or office within its boundaries and which in almost every case 
will exercise its powers in remote states and countries it is deprived 
of real vital responsibility.3 It is giving birth to children which it 
does not expect to support or govern. There is no likelihood that 
this laxity will be overcome until the jurisdiction which can create 
corporations is confined exclusively to that one which will have re-
sponsibility' ·for their actions in every place. 
1 The Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Anti· Trust Act while clarifying 
the situation and indicating undoubtedly the conviction of the public upon the proper 
policy to be henceforth pursued do not, it would seem, constitute a final and unalterable 
code of conduct for interstate businesses or lay down a mode of control which may not 
need modification. This is the view expressed by W. z. Ripley in "Trusts, Pools and 
Corporations" (1917 ed.) p. xxxii. 
•Commissioner Garfield-First Report of Comm'r of Corporations, House Doc., Vol 
51, No. 165. 
• H. L. Wilgns: "Should there be a Federal Incorporation Law for Commercial Cor· 
porations?" p. 17. 
'This point is emphasized by President Taft in his Special Message to Congress, 
Jan. 7, 1910, recommending national incorporation law. See pp. 17·20. 
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Is the remedy which is suggested5 of compulsory federal incor-
poration for all businesses engaged in interstate commerce a con-
stitutionally valid one? That is the question upon which we shall 
seek to render an opinion. We shall limit our inquiry strictly to 
the legal problems involved. For instance, although there may be 
a considerable historical interest in working out the manner and 
extent of the influence of Hamilton's Federalist papers upon Mar-
shall's train of thought6 in the early and important decisions af-
fecting this question such studies can have little or no legal sig-
nificance. Nor shall we indulge in carping criticism of the argu-
ments of the court. We are interested in constitutional interpreta-
tion: are there reasonable grounds upon which the Supreme Court 
might be expected, in conformity with its traditions, to sustain an 
act of Congress requiring that all trading bodies engaged in trans-
acting business in interstate commerce be federally incprporated? 
To attempt to solve this problem by pointing out the mistakes the 
court has made and interpreting the constitutional powers of Con-
gress as we think they ought to be interpreted logically would be 
of no avail even if it were not positively ridiculous. The only way 
to arrive at a worth-while answer to this question is to determine 
the actual construction put upon constitutional grants and inhibi-
tion~ in previous decisions, and their significance, as they stand, for 
our problem. 
The first great legal land-mark which bears upop. our inquiry is. 
the case of McCitlloch v. Maryland.1 The state of Maryland had 
attempted to tax a branch of the second Bank of the United States 
located within its jurisdictional limits. The issues raised by the 
bank's refusal to pay the assessment were substantially two: (1) 
Had the federal government any power to create a corporation? 
{2) Could a state government tax a bank federally incorporated? 
The court was led in the decision of the first issue to deliberate upon 
the nature of the power to incorporate. It decided in unmistakable 
terms : "The power of creating a corporation, tho appertaining to 
sovereignty, is not, like the power of making war or levying taxes 
or of regulating commerce, a great substantive and independent pow-
er which cannot be implied as incidental to other powers or used 
as a means of executing them. It is never the end for which other 
powers are exercised but a means by which other objects are ac-
complished. No contributions are made to charity for the sake of 
1 Bills providing for federal incorporation have been twice introduced in Congress. 
One upon Nov. 9, 1903; another Feb. 7, 1910. 
•See upon this point an excellent discussion by S. D. M. Hudson: "Federal In· 
corporation, 26 Pol Sc. Quar., 863. 
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an incorporation, but a corporation is created to administer the 
charity.*** The power of creating a corporation is never used for 
its own sake .• but for the purpose of effecting something else. No 
sufficient reason is therefore perceived why it may not pass as inci-
dental to those powers which are expressly given, if it be a direct 
mode of _executing them." 
Such being, the view of the court in regard to the nature of the 
power to incorporate and the constitutional justification for its exer-
cise by Congress there can be little doubt that it addressed its argu-
~ent toward validating incorporation of administrative am1s of the 
government. Thus if we may suppose the Interstate Commerce 
Commission to have been organized in corporate form by Congress 
for ·carrying into execution its regulatory power over interstate 
coinmerce,8 it would have been a case parallel to that presented and 
there seems no doubt but that the court would have upheld the au-
thority vested in such a body. But the court is not concerned with 
the question nor does it go out of its way to answer it whether the 
power extends further to the erection of corporations for engaging 
in a field of activity over which Congress is admittedly empowered 
to exercise exclusive control. It is true the court declares the exer-
cise of the power of incorporation to be contingent upon this : "If it 
be a direct mode of executing them," i. e., the substantive and inde-
pendent powers. 
In regard to what constitutes "a direct mode" of carrying into 
effect the powers expressly granted, the court adopts no binding and 
restrictive rule, but leaves a wide latitude of construction to Con-
gress. It is very evident from the context and vital arrangement of 
the steps in the argument that the court is disposed to regard as "a 
direct mode of executing" these powers any laws which are "neces-
sary and proper" in the words of the constitution itself. For the 
examination of that important clause follows immediately the pass-
age just quoted. In the clause9 establishing this grant the court 
finds an1ple authority for the exercise of the power of incorporation 
in the circumstances of this case, and the construction put upon the 
constitutional grant of the powers of Congress certainly does not, 
to say the least, inveigh against a resort to like means in the execu-
tion of its express powers under the importunate conditions of lat-
ter-day interstate commerce. For the court states in memorable 
T 4 Wheaton 316. 
a As a matter of fact the Supreme Court has held the Interstate Commerce Coni· 
mission to be a "body corporate." Tesas & Pacific R. R. v. I. C. C., 162 U. S, 197, In 
both form and substance however it differs radically from business corporations. 
• Constit. Art. I, Sect. 8. 
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words that: "It must have been the intention of those who gave 
these (the "substantive and independent") powers, to insure, as 
far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This 
could not be done by confining the choice of means to such narrow 
limits as not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any 
which might be appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. 
This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for 
ages to come, and, consequently to be adapted to the various crises 
of human affairs." And finally comes the famous declaration: ''Let 
the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, 
and all means which are appropriate which are plainly adapted to 
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and 
spirit of the constitution, are constitutional." 
It is worthy of note that the Chief Justice in his opinion was un-
willing to go so far as had Mr. Pinckney in his brief for the de-
fendant and rest his decision upon the argument that the bank was 
an ann of the United States government employed by it to carry 
into effect the measures of its fiscal policy~ Mr. Pinckney had 
thought to make his case secure and impregnable by asserting and 
emphasizing this aspect of the bank's constitution. He had even 
declared in his brief : "The Bank of the United States is as m11ch 
an instrument of the government for fiscal purposes as the courts 
are its instruments for judicial purposes." Insofar as the right of 
a state to tax a body is concerned,' it cannot be denied there is much 
cogency to this reasoning. But as a complete statement of the func-
tion of the bank the comparison with a court of law falls far short 
of the mark. The court has no private interests to advance. The 
bank was established for the primary purpose of engaging in pro-
ductive enterprises and gaining private profit. Its fiscal operations 
for the government were always secondary to this original and vital 
object. The Chief Justice observed great caution for these reasons 
not to overstate the case, not to overemphasize the character of the 
bank as an administrative organ of the government, for he recog-
nized that it bore no such intimate relation to the general govern-
ment as did, for instance, the courts. 
In the case of Osborne v. the Second Bank of the United States1° 
this identical question was again brought up for consideration. The 
court did not shun the task of again establishing its position in rea-
son and law. On the other hand the Chief Justice devoted his opin-
ion to an exhaustive review of all the arguments brought fonvard 
by counsel. The conclusions reached in the McCulloch case were 
10 9 Wlicat. 738. 
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reaffirmed. But the bearing of this decision upon the federal power 
of incorporation has long been misconstrued. In order to assign 
the precise significance to the train of thought of Chief Justice 
MARSITAI,I, which the words of the opinion convey, it is necessary 
to revert to the briefs presented to the court. 
The basis of Mr. Hammond's argument against the constitution-
ality of the ·bank is clearly that it was a private business organized 
for private gain, whereas it could be constitutional only if it were an 
agency or an instrumentality incorporated by Congress in order to 
~a.rry out some one of its granted or implied powers. That this is 
the essence of his argument is plain from the following excerpt: 
"Deriving great advantage from its trade, anxious to extend it into 
other states, and to be relieved from the embarrassments incident 
to a joint stock company not incorporated, the corporation applies to 
the Congress of the United States for an act of incorporation. But 
this Congress cannot confer, unless the association can be employed 
by the national government in the execution of some of the power 
with which it is invested by the constitution,"-i. e., unless the asso-
ciation have a 'political connection' with the government. The argu-
ment proceeds: "The fact that an individual employs his private 
means in the service of the government, attaches to them no im-
munity whatever. It is only in this character that the Bank is in 
public employ. The business it transacts for the government orig-
inates in contract. It receives the public treasure upon deposit, and 
pays it out upon the checks of the proper officer. This is an indi-
vidual business transacted for the government precisely as if it were 
an individual concern * * * It is one department of its trade by 
which it makes individual profit." 
Now this was the essence of the argument that Johll Marshall 
answered, and it is submitted that he cannot be considered to haYe 
used the words 'political connection' in any other sense than as they 
would be plainly understood in answering Mr. Hammond's argu-
ment. That he was addressing his reasoning to Mr. Hammond's 
argument cann.ot well be doubted considering the form in which the 
Chief Justice stated the case.11 And as to this argument, what does 
the court decide? It is this: "The argument supposes the corpora-
_tion to have been originated for the management of an individual 
concern, to be founded upon contract between individuals, having 
private trade and private profit for its great end and principal ob-
ject. If these premises were true, the conclusion drawn from them 
would be inevitable." But what was the conclusion drawn? Sim-
11 Ibid., page 859. 
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ply that the Bank was taxable by the state government. It was not 
an argument addressed to the existence of the bank. They were not 
talking about the right of Congress to erect a corporation. In short, 
they were not talking about the constitutionality of federal incor-
poration, but only about the constitutionality of state taxation of 
federal corporations of a certai-n kind.12 
The court says : "This mere private corporation, engaged in its 
own business, with its own views, would certainly be subject to tax-
ation power of the state, as any individual would be;" * * * "But 
the premises are not true. The Bank is not considered as a private 
corporation, * * * but as a public corporation, created for public and 
national purposes." And the Chief Justice continues in these words: 
"It was not created for its own sake or private purposes. It has 
never been supposed that Congress could create such a corporation." 
Now what is the proper meaning of this last phrase? This is the 
decisive question. It seems to me that, considering the context, it 
can only be understood to mean: that Congress could not create a 
corporation for private purposes which woitld be exempt from state 
ta:i:ation. This question was certainly the only one the court had to 
decide, and consequently was in all prob.ability the only one they 
had in mind. There was no other point involved. 
When the Chief Justice goes on to consider: "Why is it that Con-
gress can incorporate or create a bank?" it should be borne in mind 
that he is not taking up the justification for any act of federal incor-
p.oration whatsoever, but only of a corporation which shoitld. be 
exempt from state taxation. One may fairly conclude that there 
were no lurking doubts in the minds of the court about the power 
of Congress to incorporate an ordinary corporation; or even that 
such an ordinary business corporation, federally chartered, might be 
taxed by a state government. The only point admissible to contro-
versy was: Why is it that Congress can incorporate or create a Bank 
--i.e., a private enterprise yet so constituted by its "political con-
nection" with the federal government as to be exempt from state 
ta..'ration. And the substance of the argument that follows is that 
because "it is an instrument which is 'necessary and proper' for 
carrying on the fiscal operations of government," it is, despite its 
organization for private profit, exempt from state taxation. 'l'hat 
this is in fact the whole trend of the argument becomes so apparent 
as scarcely to admit of a doubt when at the conclusion there occurs 
12 This is why all the hair-splitting argument ov~ the phrase "politic:11 connection" 
is beside the point. Goodnow: "Social Reform and the Constitution," Chap. III. Hudson: 
"Federal Incorporation," Pol. Sc. Quar. (19n) p. 75 et seq. 
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this remark: "To tax its faculties, its trades, and occupation, is to 
tax the bank itself. To destroy or preserve the one is to destroy 
or preserve the other." 
The charter of the second Bank of the United States, however, 
expired by limitation in 1834 and was not renewed. But the finan-
cial exigencies of the Civil War again brought about a demand for a 
national banking system. After some impractical experimentation 
the law of June 3rd, 1864, was passed, which provided the frame-
work for our national banking system for half a century. Under it 
~anks might be organized under a federal charter, and provision 
was made for note-issue upon the basis of United States bonds de-
posited with a bureau of the federal government. 
A leading case which arose under this law was that of Farmers 
and Mechanics Bank v. Dearing.13 The facts were that a promissory 
note had been discounted by the plaintiff bank at the rate of ten 
per centum per annum. The maximum rate legally chargeable in 
that jurisdiction (New York) was seven per centum per annum. 
The Act of Congress had provided that "charging a greater rate of 
interest than the legal should be held and adjudged a forfeiture of 
the entire interest which the note carries with it," whereas by the 
New York rule the penalty was a forfeiture of the entire principal 
of the note. In this case, then, we are again confronted 'vith a state 
regulation of a corporation which is chartered by, and an agency of, 
the federal government. The regulation is of a different character 
but the power brought in question is identical. Can Congress create a 
corporation which not only may not be taxed by a state government 
but which may not be subject to state regulations of civil liability? 
The court said: "The constitutionality of the act of 1864 is not in 
question. It rests on the same principle as the act creating the sec-
ond Bank of the United States. * * * The national banks organized 
under the act are instruments designed to be used to aid the govern-
ment in the administration of an important branch of the public serv-
ice. They are means appropriate to that end. Of the degree of the 
necessity which existed for creating them, Congress is the sole 
judge. * * * The power to create carries with it the power to pre-
serve. The latter is a corollary from the former. The principle an-
nounced in the authority cited is indispensable to the efficiency, the 
independence. and indeed to the beneficial existence of the General 
Government, otherwise it would be liable, in the discharge of its 
most important trusts to be annoyed and thwarted by the will or 
caprice of every state in the Union. Infinite confusion would fol-
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low. The government would be reduced to a pitiable condition of 
weakness." 
Here again it is affirmed that the states may· not "by taxation or 
otherwise. * * * burthen or in any manner control" a corporation, 
federally chartered, which exercises the powers of an agent of the 
central government in the execution of any of the powers vested in 
it. Over such class of federal ·Corporations the laws of the states 
are ineffectual, save in those respects upon which Congress is silent 
and in which the application of the state law is not inconsistent14 
with the express or implied will of Congress. But again we should 
remind ourselves that the case in no way impinges the latent power 
to create federal corporations which are not "instruments designed 
to be used to aid the government in the administration of an im-
portant branch of the public service" as the court describes the 
national banks in this case. For this other class of federal corpora-
tions may be subject to state control in greater degree; but at least 
there is no argument here as to their constitutionality. 
Now the contribution this line of bank cases makes to constitu-
tional interpretation in respect of the power of Congress under the 
interstate commerce clause to create federal corporations is mainly 
negative but partly positive. It is positive insofar as it established 
beyond dispute the power of Congress to erect corporations at all. 
There is no express constitutional grant of power to incorporate, 
but by this line of cases that power has been definitely settled, so 
far at least as this : that it may be used to carry out a constitutional 
power. The remaining question is: in how far may the exercise of 
this power be limited by the requirement of its employment only 
as an agency for the execution of an express power? In short, may 
it be used as an indirect as well as a direct agency? The negative 
contribution of these bank cases, providing the validity of the fore-
going analysis be accepted, is that the power is not expressly limited 
to a ci:eation of arms of the government. It is not confined to the 
grant of a corporate form to governmental bureaus, commissions 
and offices charged with the administration of a particular function 
of the federal government. Nor if this position can be supported 
by subsequent developments is this negative contribution to be con-
sidered lightly and as of small significance. On the contrary it is 
because the legal profession has failed to see in this line of cases 
any other principle than a direct denial of the power of Congress 
to erect business and manufacturing corporations that they have been 
skeptical of its constitutionality. 
" See 91 U. S. 34-35. 
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Accordingly our next step will be to seek to determine whether 
and how far the assertion of this power of incorporation in other 
directions is, according to judicial determination, consistent with the 
view expressed above. Have subsequent decisions involving this 
power of Congress interpreted it as ,extending beyond the rigid lim-
its of such bodies as have a "political connection" with the central 
government?, And if so, does the direction of such interpretation 
lend cogency to the argument that Congress by virtue of its ex-
haustive control over interstate commerce may require all business 
groups and bodies, other than individual citizens, engaging therein 
to be chartered by the federal government? 
The second direction, in point both of time and of importance, in 
which Congress has exercised its power to create corporations was 
the chartering of the Pacific railroads. This use of the power to 
incorporate like that in connection with the national banking system 
came out of the pressing emergencies of the Civil War. It was a 
period of national peril and of constitutional turmoil. Neverthe-
less the steps taken then cannot be retraced ; and they have exer-
cised a profound influence upon our constitutional development in 
many ways. 
The question has sometimes been raised whether the Pacific rail-
roads were actually federal corporations or merely state corporations 
to whom were granted certain federal franchises. But there can 
be no doubt, in view of the wording of the statutes, that Congress 
did by the act of July I, 1862, and by the provisions of the act of 
July 2, 1864, authorize federal incorporation. Subsequently in 18:30, 
acting in reliance upon Section 161G of each of those acts a consol-
idation was effected between the Union Pacific Railroad Company 
(which was already wholly a federal company) and the Kansas 
Pacific Railway Company and the Denver Pacific Railway and 'J'el-
egraph Company. This consolidation was named The Union Pacific 
Railway Company, and in the case of Ames v. Kansas,16 it was held 
to accede to full capacities of the original company having a specific 
grant of charter, and to have legally absorbed the constituent state 
and territorial corporations. And in California v. Central Pad.fie Rail-
"'July 1, 1862, Section 16-"That at any time after the pass:ige of this act all of the 
railroad companies named herein, and assenting thereto, or any two or more of them, .have 
authority to form themselves into one consolidated company; notice of such consolidation 
in writing shall be filed in the Department of the Interior, and such consolidated company 
shall thereafter proceed to construct said railroad and branches and telegraph line upon 
the terms and conditions provided in this act." 
:sJI III U. S. 449• 
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road Company11 the court again recognized that the grant of certain 
valuable franchises to a state corporation coupled with its accept-
ance of the same and registration in the Department of Interior, 
constituted it a federal corporation. In this latter case the court 
states : "Thus without referring to the other franchises and priv-
ileges conferred upon this company, the fundamental franchise was 
given by the acts of 1862 and the subsequent Acts to construct a 
railroad from the Pacific Ocean across the state of California and 
the federal territories, until it should meet the Union Pacific; which 
it did meet at Ogden, in the terirtory of Utah. This important 
grant, tho in part collateral to, was independent of, that made to the 
corporation by the State of California, and has ever since been pos-
sessed and enjoyed.*** If, therefore, the Central Pacific Railroad 
Company is not a federal corporation its most important franchises, 
including that of constructing a railroad from the Pacific Ocean to 
Ogden City, were conferred upon it by Congress." And as evidence 
that the change was considered as a change of the source of their 
charter, the Kansas Pacific Railway Company as a part of Union 
Pacific Railroad Company reenacted its by-laws and reelected its 
officers. 
In this same case appears the well-considered opinion that the 
power of Congress over interstate commerce includes the power to 
erect corporations to transact interstate business, and that its power 
in this direction is full and exhaustive. The passage is important 
and I quote at length: "It cannot at the present day be doubted 
that Congress, under the power to regulate commerce among the 
several states as well as to provide for postal accommodations and 
military exigencies, had authority to pass these laws. The power 
to construct or to authorize individuals or corporations to construct 
national highways and bridges from state to state, is essential to the 
complete control of interstate commerce. Without authority in 
Congress to establish and maintain such highways and bridges. it 
would be without authority to regulate one of the most important 
adjuncts of commerce. This power in former times was exerted to 
a very limited extent, the Cumberland or National Road being the 
most notable instance. * * * But, since in consequence of the ex-' 
pansion of the country, the multiplication of its products, and the 
invention of railroads and locomotion by steam, land transportation 
has so vastly increased, a sounder consideration of the subject has 
prevailed and led to the conclusion that Congress has plenary power 
over the whole subject. * * * (This) power was very freely exer-
tT 127 U. S. 41. 
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cised and much to the general satisfaction in the creation of the vast 
system of railroad connecting the East with the Pacific, traversing 
States as well as Territories, and employing the agency of state as 
well as federal corporations." 
It will be noticed here that there was maintained a carefully con-
structed barrier behind which future decisions might hedge if occa-
sion demanded. In spite of such phrases as "complete control,'' and 
"plenary power" the opinion constantly bears on the fact that in 
this case it is dealing with a transportation agency as such, and even 
i:efers to the Cumberland Road, presumably for the purpose of draw-
ing the parallel to highways which from time immemorial have been 
regarded as peculiarly under the care of the government. Never-
theless this identification cannot be admitted as complete. There 
are important differences between private railroads, though com-
mon carriers, and public highways. 
But the point is that there is a step forward from the position 
reached in the bank cases, in that common carriers are not adminis-
trative organs of the general government in any sense. Their in-
corporation, moreover, is not a direct but an indirect means of reg-
ulating interstate commerce. First, it is decided that Congress may 
incorporate bodies serving as administrative arms of the govern-
ment. Second, it is decided that Congress may incorporate public 
service businesses engaged in the actual transfer of goods,18 persons, 
intelligence, etc., in interstate commerce. Third, it remains to be 
determined whether Congress may incorporate ordinary mercantile 
and manufacturing bodies transacting business across state bound-
aries. Fourth. it further remains to be determined whether Con-
gress may make federal incorporation for firms so engaged com-
pulsory. 
The distinction between the second and third classes of business 
is well recognized, the familiar legal characterization of it is ~hat the 
former are "affected with a public interest" and for that reason 
bear "a special relation" to the governing authority. But the dis-
tinction between the first and second classes of organization is no 
less marked. In upholding the power exercised in the creation of 
the Pacific railroad corporations the court made a signal advance 
over the stage of constitutional interpretation in this direction 
reached by the line of bank cases. Moreover, we should remember 
that the distinction between the agent conducting the transportation 
DA short hut incisive review of the authorities upon this point is contained in an 
article in 30 Harvard Law Review, 589 by C. W. Bunn. The author seems inclined to 
minimize the difficulties that will be encountered, ho\vever. 
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in interstate commerce and the business whose property is moved 
in interstate commerce has never been employed in any decisive way 
in any case up to the present time; as has the distinction between 
manufacturing and commerce. Hence the gap to be bridged in ex-
tending the power of incorporation to the third class of business 
would seem no more difficult to negotiate than the step taken from 
the first to the second class. 
To continue, the principal point in the above case of Californfrz. v. 
Pacific Railroad Company19 is whether or not a state may tax a 
corporation, as such, which derives its franchise from the federal 
government. The court follows the same rule in regard to trans-
portation corporations that it had already laid down in respect of 
banking corporations. The court said: They (the franchises) were 
granted to the company for national purposes and to subserve na-
tional ends. It seems very clear that the state of California can 
neither take them away nor destroy nor abridge them, nor cripple 
them by onerous burdens. Can it tax them? It may undoubtedly 
tax outside visible property of the company situated within the state. 
This is a different thing. But can it tax franchises which are the 
grant of the United States? In our judgment it cannot." The 
court goes on to define a franchise which it says is : "a right, privi-
lege, or power of public concern, which ought not to be exercised 
by private individuals at their mere will and pleasure, but should be 
reserved for public control and administration, either by the govern-
ment directly or by public agents, acting under such conditions and 
regulations as the government may impose in the public interest and 
for the public security." 
It should be evident that the court means by "public agents," the 
railroad companies themselves and not such administrative bodies 
over the railroads as the Interstate Commerce Commission was sub-
sequently constituted. For this reason in the application of the 
term "public agents" a wide latitude may be sanctioned, since it is 
clear that the decision in each one of these western railway cases is 
based on the Congressional control over interstate commerce and 
not on the postal or military power. Consequently it would seem 
that the essential elements constituting these bodies "public agents" 
is the grant of a franchise to conduct an interstate transportation 
business in the public interest, but for private profit. It may be an-
swered that Congress created these transportation systems under 
special circumstances and exigencies to facilitate interstate com-
merce. But even so, is not Congress the judge of the degree of 
:19 127 u. s. 40. 
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necessity which exists to warrant the facilitation of interstate com-
merce by requiring uniform federal incorporation? Once admitted 
that the power rests in Congress to erect corporations for facilitat-
ing interstate commerce, in determining the conditions which justify 
its exercise and the extent of its exercise, the court will not review 
the wisdomzo of the legislative policy. 
The view of the status of these western railroads which has been 
taken above is fully confirmed by the decisions in the two following 
cases, in both of which this point was adjudicated: Railroad Com-
pany v. Peniston21 and the United States v. The Union Pacific Rail-
road Company.22 In the latter case the court stated: "The proposi-
tion is that the United States, as the grantor of the franchises of the 
company, the author of its charter, and the donor of lands, rights, 
and privileges of immense value, and as parens patriae, is a trustee, 
invested with power to enforce the proper use of the property and 
franchises granted for the benefit of the public. * * * But in answer 
to this it must be said that, after all, it is but a railroad company, 
with the ordinary powers of such corporations.23 Under its contract 
with the government, the latter has taken good care of itself; and 
its rights may be judicially enforced without the aid of this trust 
relati9n. They may be aided by the general legislative powers of 
Congress (those of any sovereign over the corporations which it 
creates), and by those reserved in the charter. 
That the court did not at this period consider that it was justi-
fied in "going the whole length," however, (as this passage might 
intimate) and validating this exercise of the power of incorporation 
upon the broad ground that it was competent for Congress, by vir-
tue of its full and exclusive power over interstate commerce, to in-
corporate all commercial bodies engaged in that commerce is evident 
from the subsequent decision in the Pacific Removal cases.2"' There. 
the issue turned upon a jurisdictional matter and does not concern 
us, but the principle contained in the following statement is signifi-
cant in regard to the court's view of the status of these corpora-
tions. "The Union Pacific Railroad Company * * * was strictly a 
corporation of the United States*** The facts that the last-named 
company is one of the constituent elements of the consolidated com-
pany, and that the entire system of roads now in its possession and 
"'Marbflr;v v. Madison, 1 Cranch 13?; Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, n 
Peters 420; McCray v. United States, 195 U. S. 27. 
2118 Wall. 5. 
"'98 u. s. 569, 61~·619 • 
.. Italics mine. 
SI 115 U. S. 1, 15. 
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under its charge and control constitutes one of the most comprehen-
sive and important mediums of interstate commerce in the country, 
and that in all its transactions it is subject to the supervision and 
control of the Government of the United States are sufficient, it 
seems to us, to bring the Kansas cases, as well as the other cases, 
fairly within the principle of Osborn v. The Bank." The railroads 
are, thus, a "medium" of interstate commerce and not merely a trad-
ing body engaged in that commerce. They are technological instru-
ments for the interstate distribution of goods-sharply distinguish-
ed from the commodities which pass along these channels.25 
We may conclude that the following principles are confirmed or 
established by these western railroad cases : first, Congress may char-
ter corporations for certain purposes ; second, Congress may create 
railroad corporations to engage in interstate transportation, i. e., 
corporations endowed with a public interest but organized and con-
ducted by private patties strictly for profit; third, it is a sufficient 
basis for the exercise of this power that in the judgment of Con-
gress the erection of such corporations will "tend to facilitate" inter-
state commerce. It is not for the courts to decide upon the expe-
diency of employing this means of "facilitating commerce"-that is 
left to the discretion of Congress. A fourth point is found in the 
fact that while the decisions certainly do not affirm that any more 
extensive power to incorporate resides with Congress, yet they do 
not deny either expressly or by strong implication that ordinary 
trading bodies engaged in interstate commerce may be so incorpor-
ated. Accordingly it remains to inquire whether upon any subse-
quent occasions in which Congress may have directly exercised its 
power to incorporate the court has modified this position, either by 
restricting the power to administrative anns of the government and 
public-service or "national-service" industries, or by extending it to 
_ ordinary private business concerns. 
The next direction in which Congress saw fit to exercise its pow-
er to incorporate was in the creation of a bridge company.26 Some 
difficulty having arisen in regard to the _acquisition of land at con-
venient points in the states of New Jersey and New York, and the 
right to bridge the navigable waters of the Hudson River, a charter 
'"See Johnson v. So. Pac. Co., 196 U. S. 1. 
"" It has been a general rule even where state corporations wished to construct a 
bridge across navigable streams to apply for the approval of Congress. See Southern 
Illinois and Missouri Bridge Co. v. Stone, 174 Mo. 1; and Williamette Bridge Co. v. 
Hatch, 1.25 U. S. 12, and cases cited. And in one such instance the right of eminent 
domain was granted by Congress. Stockton v. Baltimore & N. Y. R. R., 32 Fed. 9. 
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was granted for the purpose upon application to Congress.27 The Act 
of Congress of July II, ISsJo, incorporating the company, after pro-
viding specifically for the usual corporate powers, further provides 
that: "r1nd generally and specially for the fully carrying out of the 
provisions of this act, the said North River Bridge Company and its 
successors shall have and possess all such right and power to enter 
upon lands, and for the purchase, acquisition, condemnation, * * * 
and use of real estate and other property, and for the location, con-
struction, operation and maintenance of said bridge with its ap-
p_roaches, terminals and appurtenances as are possessed by the rail-
road or bridge companies in the States of New York and New Jer-
sey, respectively." 
On the problem of the objects for which Congress may create 
corporations this case throws no new light. One sentence will indi-
cate this : ''Congress, therefore, may create corporations as appro-
priate means of executing the powers of government, as, for in-
stance, a bank for the purpose of carrying on the fiscal operations 
qf the United States or a railroad corporation for the purpose of 
promoting commerce28 among the states." And the court continues : 
"The power of Congress, by its own legislation, to confer original 
authority to erect bridges over navigable streams whenever Congress 
considers it necessary to do so to meet the demands of the interstate 
commerce by land is so clearly demonstrated, as to render further 
discussion of the subject superfluous." It should be evident, there-
fore, that the principle of this case does not extend beyond that 
of the western railroad cases, though it certainly confirms and for-
tifies it.29 But it does open the way very clearly to an extension of 
the position then arrived at; for in the opinion, delivered by Justice 
GRAY, great emphasis is placed upon the broad doctrine that this 
was a means "to facilitate commerce" approved by Congress. Now 
if this be the test of the extent of the power in Congress to incor-
porate it certainly provides an "open door'' for upholding a com-
pulsory national incorporation law. To require uniform rules of 
liability, of stock-issue, of dividend-declaration, of the accountabil-
ity of directors-to place all national business within one legal juris-
:n Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U. S. 525. 
:s Italics by the present writer. The great disparity in the nature of the two pur· 
poses should not escape attention. . 
"'In this case altho the act of incorporation mentions the motives of provision for 
post-roads and military equipment in addition to the promotion of interstate commerce, 
yet it is clear that the bridge was intended primarily for the improvement of the mediums 
of interstate commerce. The time element no less than the place consideration supports 
this view. See also the words of Mr. Justice Miller in U. S. v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Co., 98 U. S. 618-619. 
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diction-surely this would "facilitate interstate commerce" more 
than many North River bridges. The added security and stability 
would increase the volume of interstate dealing considerably and 
hence augment the national income. And what means could be 
more "appropriate," more suitable, more equitable, more politic than 
to require federal incorporation of companies doing an interstate 
business? Indeed what other means is available that does not di-
rectly impose limitations30 upon the sovereign action of the states ; 
and lead to enormous wastes in jurisdictional litigation? How-
ever we must remember that the North River Bridge case itself does 
no more than open the way for the general application of this 
broad test to the constitutionality of acts of Congress involving this 
power. For actually in this case as in the western railroad cases the 
court was dealing with a class of corporations which have always 
borne a peculiar place in our polity. They were all public utilities. 
Three were common carriers and one was the operator of a public 
toll bridge. All were bound to serve the public. They were author-
ized to exercise the power of eminent domain. Nevertheless the 
broad ground upon which the court did base its decision in the North 
, River Bridge case has a considerable significance as we have indi-
cated. 
Congress has exercised the power of incorporation in a national 
way in still another class of cases, the constitutionality of which has 
never been questioned before the Supreme Court. Congress has 
erected corporations to provide and maintain homes for disabled 
soldiers and for other charitable purposes. The construction put 
upon this power by the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of 0'ller-
lwlser v. National Home for Disabled Soldiers31 is interesting as 
manifesting the att.itude taken by the states. The officers of the cor-
poration were sued in tort and the court considered the question of 
whether these officers were in effect agents of the United States and 
the United States itself the real party in interest. The court de-
cided that: "A suit against a public corporation, having no other 
powers than the performance of a function of the government and 
accomplishing no other object is plainly a suit against the govern-
ment." And it. remarked in a passage construing the character of 
the corporation: "that it is performing an appropriate and constitu-
tional function of the general government nobody doubts, for at 
this time it is too late to question the power of Congress to create 
80 In regard to infringement upon reserve powers of the states, see Wilgus, op. cit., 
pp. 37-47. Hendrick: "Power to Regulate Corporations ••• " does not think this objec-
tion would be vital, pp. a67·270. 
:n 67 N. E. 487. 
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corporations for such purposes." Evidently the court was under the 
impression that all the instances in which this power had so far been 
exercised by Congress fell within that category, for the latest case 
of Liexton v. North River Bridge Company was cited in support of 
the conclusion. As we have seen, however, such a construction of 
the western railroad cases, at least, is too narrow in view of all the 
facts. 
MYRON W. WATKIN~. 
University of Missouri. 
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